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Abstract 
Using the basic overlapping generations one-sector model of endogenous growth we show that unionisation of labour 
markets may be growth-enhancing with respect to the standard competitive equilibrium economy with full 
employment, provided the capital's weight in technology and the replacement rate are both high enough. Moreover, a 
growth-maximising value of the union''s relative wage intensity does exist. In particular, a wage-oriented rather than an 
employment-oriented union should be preferred as an inducement to a higher per capita income growth. Therefore, an 
appropriate combination of both union''s behaviour and government policies may trigger a virtuous growth mechanism. 
A policy implication is that the government could follow the union''s growth-maximising rule simply by choosing 
properly the replacement rate. Moreover, along the balanced growth path, individuals can be better off in a unionised 
economy with unemployment rather than in the competitive economy with full employment.
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1. Introduction 
 
The persistently high rates of unemployment in Europe, which, together with the low rates of per 
capita income growth – at least relative to those experienced in both the US and several Asian 
countries –, represent a major concern for current policies, are often associated with the existence of 
unionised  labour  markets.  Although  the  centrality  of  unemployment  and  economic  growth  in 
macroeconomics is undoubted, most of the related economic literature has devoted to each of them 
separately, and only  a  few papers  have  investigated the effects of unemployment on economic 
growth in the same breath. 
    On  the  empirical  ground,  the  sign  of  the  correlation  between  economic  growth  and 
unemployment is controversial, either across countries or over long periods of time in the same 
country. In particular, to sum up the results of the empirical literature we may distinguish three 
cases: (i) the correlation is essentially zero, e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1992), who reported that both 
high  and  low  growth  countries  experienced  lower  unemployment  rates  relative  to  those  with 
intermediate rates of productivity growth among the 20 OECD countries included in their study. 
Bean and Pissarides (1993), instead, found no correlation between unemployment and the measures 
of productivity growth across OECD economies; (ii) the correlation is negative, e.g., Hoon and 
Phelps (1997), Muscatelli and Tirelli (2001); and (iii) the correlation is positive, e.g. Caballero 
(1993) who reported a positive time series relationship between growth and unemployment both in 
the UK and US between 1966 and 1989, whereas Muscatelli and Tirelli (2001) accounted for a 
negative correlations for the five G7 economies but UK and US. 
On the theoretical side, the common wisdom framed in the basic one-sector overlapping generations 
(OLG) model of growth argued essentially either for a negative relationship between unemployment 
and the rate of per capita income growth, e.g. Daveri and Tabellini (2000), or at most for a neutral 
one (e.g. Corneo and Marquardt, 2000). An exception is represented by Irmen and Wigger (2002), 
which  instead  found,  under  some  rather  restrictive  technological  conditions,  that  a  positive 
relationship between economic growth and unemployment, as detailed below. 
    It must be noted, however, that in models at all different from the basic Cobb-Douglas one-sector 
OLG setting analysed here, some authors predict that the unionisation of labour markets might not 
necessarily be growth-reducing, owing to the existence of an interaction between heterogeneous 
agents and sectors,
1 frictions, uncertainty, irreversibilities, agents’ infinite horizon, and so on. For 
instance: (i) Agell and Lommerud (1993) analysed a multi-sector economy where a trade union 
pursuing an egalitarian wage policy can increase the productivity growth by favouring a reduction 
in the wage differentials  between  low-productivity  and  high-productivity  sectors; (ii) Bean  and 
Pissarides (1993), building on a search model where unemployment is due to matching frictions in 
the labour market, showed that the relationship between economic growth and the relative workers’ 
bargaining power is ambiguous to the extent that a shift in income from entrepreneurs to workers is 
compensated by an increase in the saving rate and, hence, in the growth rate; (iii) Aghion and 
Howitt  (1994),  exploiting  the  Schumpeterian  idea  of  creative  disruption,  concluded  that  the 
unemployment induced by labour market imperfections could enhance economic growth; (iv) de la 
Croix and Licandro (1995), analysing a model with irreversible decisions, showed that a rise in the 
union power, on the one hand, reduces the physical capital and, on the other hand, increases both 
the value of the firm and the physical capital, so that the final effect of unionisation on growth is 
ambiguous;  (v)  Palokangas  (1996)  analysed  a  two-sector  model  (the  final  good  and  the  R&D 
sectors) with skilled and unskilled workers, and argued that under some rather stringent conditions 
(separated skilled and unskilled labour markets; skilled and unskilled workers are complements in 
                                                 
1 As a matter of fact, it is worth noting that the unionisation of labour markets may be growth-reducing even when an 
interaction between sectors exists. For instance, Quang and Vousden (2002), building on a four-sector OLG model (a 
competitive final goods sector; two intermediate goods – competitive and monopolistic – sectors; a competitive R&D 
sector), found that a rise in the union bargaining power in the monopolised intermediate-good sector reduces the growth 
rate of the economy.   2 
the production of final goods; the R&D sector employs only skilled labour), a positive relationship 
between unionisation and economic growth may be possible when production in the R&D sector 
increases enough; (vi) developing an OLG model with two sectors (the consumption goods and the 
educational sectors), inter-generational altruism and human capital, Ramos-Parreno and Sánchez-
Losada (2002) showed that the unionisation of labour markets in the consumption goods sector: (a) 
causes unemployment in that sector and (b) reduces the wage rate in the educational sector. The 
latter effect in turn implies a higher return from human capital investments leading definitively to 
(c) a rise in the production of human capital and (d) a higher rate of per capita income growth; (vii) 
assuming a static two-sector economy (the intermediate and the final goods sectors) with skilled and 
unskilled workers, Cardona and Sánchez-Losada (2006) showed that in some cases the unionisation 
of both skilled and unskilled labour may have a positive impact on the final goods production. 
    The  present  paper  is  framed  in  the  basic  one-sector  OLG  growth  theoretical  literature  and 
investigates how unions affect economic growth and welfare in context where a Romer-type capital 
investment externality (assumed here to be the average per capita stock of capital installed in the 
whole economy) represents the engine of endogenous growth. In contrast with the prevailing past 
literature, we show that if the government provides an unemployment benefit to the young people 
when unemployed, the unionisation of labour markets can lead to a more rapid per capita income 
growth than that of a competitive equilibrium economy with full employment, in spite of a reduced 
employment rate. 
    Our  model differ  from the above  mentioned  literature framed  in the one-sector OLG growth 
context mainly as regards the following two features: (i) the type of production externality, and (ii) 
the  type  of  union  behaviour.  As  regard  the  former,  we  assume  that  the  Romer-type  capital 
investment externality is given by the per capita stock of capital installed in the whole economy 
(e.g. Daveri and Tabellini, 2000; Irmen and Wigger, 2002) rather than expressed by the stock of 
capital in per worker terms (e.g. Corneo and Marquardt, 2000).
2 As regards the latter, we follow 
both Corneo and Marquardt (2000) and Irmen and Wigger (2002) by considering a right-to-manage 
union which cares about wages and employment and then chooses unilaterally the wage rate, rather 
than postulating an only wage-interested monopoly union (e.g. Daveri and Tabellini, 2000). 
    In contrast with both the above cited literature and the present paper, where unions are assumed 
to be of either the right-to-manage type or the monopoly union type with firms being free to choose 
unilaterally  the  employment  rate,  some  authors  postulating  the  “efficient  bargaining”  model 
(McDonald and Solow, 1981; Clark, 1990), where firms and unions bargain over both wage and 
employment and the wage rate is only a fraction of total output with the rest being a pure profit, 
have argued that both in a two-period OLG context with either constant (Devereux and Lockwood, 
1991) or increasing (Coimbra et al., 2005) returns to scale and in an infinite horizon context (Chang 
et al., 2007), an economy with unionised labour may have a better economic performance than a 
competitive labour market economy.
3 
    It must be emphasised that the beneficial effect of unionisation described in this paper hinges 
upon a different mechanism than those described above. In particular, while the results of our paper 
are intrinsically not comparable with those obtained in papers abstracting from the one-sector OLG 
structure or assuming an “efficient bargaining” framework, they may be related to the main results 
obtained  by  Irmen  and  Wigger  (2002),  and  hence  they  deserve  a  brief  discussion  as  to  the 
comparison between them: different from Irmen and Wigger (2002), we assume a double Cobb-
Douglas OLG economy and a government which redistributes resources within the same working 
                                                 
2 We note that, although so far not evidenced in the economic literature, these two seemingly similar formulations lead 
to strongly different outcomes as regards the relationship between unionisation and economic growth, as shown in 
another companion paper in progress. 
3 In particular, to note other distinctive features of these articles, Devereux and Lockwood (1991) also allowed for the 
existence of a stock market in a standard double Cobb-Douglas OLG economy, while Coimbra et al. (2005) assumed an 
OLG economy with a linear rather than with the usual well-behaved utility function also allowing for a labour-leisure 
choice. Chang et al. (2007), using a growth model with agents’ infinite horizon showed that a positive relationship 
between unionisation and economic growth may emerge by the nature of internal conflict within a political union.   3 
age generation with an unemployment benefit policy at a balanced budget. We show that if both the 
technology  of  production  is  relatively  capital-oriented,  rather  than  labour-oriented  (that  is,  the 
relative weight of capital is high enough), and the unemployment benefit is sufficiently high, then a 
relatively wage-oriented union may promote economic growth in spite of a reduced employment 
rate.  Irmen  and  Wigger  (2002),  instead,  found  that  an  economy  with  unionised  labour  and 
unemployment may growth faster than the competitive equilibrium economy with full employment 
if and only if the sum of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in efficiency units 
and the output elasticity of labour in efficiency units is smaller than unity. Therefore, we may note 
that when production takes place according to a Cobb-Douglas technology, the beneficial effect of 
unionisation on economic growth described by Irmen and Wigger would not hold any longer, while 
our result would hold, a fortiori, by assuming, in line with Irmen and Wigger, a production function 
where capital and labour are relatively complement. 
    To  sum  up,  the  union-growth-enhancing  mechanism  described  in  this  paper  depends  on  the 
mutual  relationship  between  the  weight  that  the  union  attaches  to  wages  and  the  size  of  the 
replacement  rate  (as  part  of  the  unemployment  benefit  system).  In  particular,  if  the  latter  is 
sufficiently high the saving rate increases along with the union’s relative wage intensity, leading 
definitively to a higher rate of per capita income growth in spite of a higher unemployment rate. 
    Our finding is, to the best of our knowledge, a novelty and contributes to fill a gap in the existing 
theoretical  literature  on  endogenous  growth  with  imperfect  labour  markets.  Noteworthy,  our 
conclusions are reached  within the  basic one-sector OLG model of growth with Cobb-Douglas 
utility and production functions where the usual Romer-type technological externality represents the 
engine of endogenous growth. 
    The policy implications are straightforward: depending on the mutual relationship between the 
capital’s weight in technology and the replacement rate, a growth-maximising value of the relative 
intensity  between wages and  employment  in the union’s objective  function exists; therefore,  in 
order to promote both economic growth and welfare, the government should follow the union’s 
growth-maximising rule choosing appropriately the replacement rate. 
    The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we develop the model and the 
main growth and welfare effects of unionisation are analysed and discussed; Section 3 concludes. 
 




Consider an OLG economy populated by identical two-period lived individuals (Diamond, 1965). 
Life is divided into youth (working period) and old-age (retirement period) and, for simplicity, 
population is assumed to stay constant over time. Individuals belonging to generation  t ( t N ) are 
endowed with a homothetic and separable lifetime utility function ( t U ) defined over  t c , 1  and  1 , 2 + t c , 
i.e.  working  period  consumption  and  retirement  period  consumption,  respectively.  Only  young 
individuals join the workforce and supply inelastically one unit of labour on the labour market, 
while  receiving  a  unitary  wage  income  at  the  non-competitive  rate  t u w , .  Therefore, the  labour 
market does not clear and involuntary unemployment occurs. The aggregate unemployment rate 
(defined in terms of fractions of time not worked) is  ( ) t t t t N L N u / - = , where  t L  is the labour 
demand.
4 Moreover, young age individuals are entitled to an unemployment benefit – defined to be 
                                                 
4  In  this  model  there  is  no  uncertainty,  hence  each  young  agent  will  be  employed  for  t u - 1   units  of  time  and 
unemployed for the remaining fraction  t u  (see Fanti and Gori, 2007). In other words, the unionisation reduces the 
employed time of each individual, rather than causing some individuals to be employed at higher wages and others to be 
unemployed. It is important to note, however, that this hypothesis is just the same as assuming two types of individuals,   4 
a fraction of the prevailing competitive wage, that is,  t c t w z b , :=  with  1 0 < < z  being the so-called 
replacement rate –, for the time left unemployed by the unionisation of the labour market.
5 When 
old agents are retired and live on the proceeds of their savings ( t s ) plus the accrued interest at the 
rate  1 + t r . 
    Therefore, the representative individual born at time t faces the following programme: 
  { } ( ) ( ) 1 , 2 , 1 , ln ln max
1 , 2 , 1 + + =
+ t t t c c c c U
t t b ,  (P) 
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where  0 > t t  is a consumption tax and  1 0 < < b  is the subjective discount factor, i.e., the higher b  
is the more individuals prefer to smooth consumption over time. In other words,  b  represents the 
degree of individual’s (im)patience to consume over the life cycle. 
    Maximisation  of  (P)  thus  gives  the  following  first  and  second  period  of  life  consumption 
functions: 
  ( )( ) ( ) [ ] t t t t u
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whereas the saving function is: 










As in Romer (1986), and similarly with Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and Irmen and Wigger (2002), 
we assume the technology of production faced by each firm as: 
 




, t i t i t t i L K k B Y ,  (4) 
where the index i denotes the typical firm,  i Y  is total output produced by firm i,  t i K ,  and  t i L ,  are 
the capital and the labour inputs hired in that firm, respectively,  t t t N K k / :=  is the average capital 
per capita installed in the overall economy,
6 which is taken as given by each single firm,  0 > B  
represents a scale parameter and  1 0 < <a  is the capital’s weight in technology. Setting  t t i L L = , , 
t t i K K = ,   and  t t i Y Y = , ,  the  time-t  aggregate  production  function  takes  place  according  to 
a a a - - =
1 1
t t t t L K k B Y , where  ( ) t t t N u L - = 1  is the total labour force employed at the aggregate level. 
Therefore,  the  intensive-form  (per  capita)  aggregate  production  function  may  be  written  as 
( )
a - - =
1 1 t t t u k B y  where  t t t N Y y / := . Knowing that (i) the stock of capital depreciates fully at the 
end of each period, and (ii) the price of final output is normalised to unity, profit maximisation 
leads to the following marginal conditions for capital and labour, respectively: 
                                                                                                                                                            
i.e., employed and unemployed agents earning a non-competitive wage and a public provided unemployment benefit, 
respectively. 
5 Notice that we consider the replacement rate to be an exogenous policy parameter, while the unemployment rate is 
endogenously determined. 
6 It is important to note that different from Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and Irmen and Wigger (2002), Corneo and 
Marquardt (2000) assumed the productivity parameter of the learning-by-investing externality to be equal to the average 
capital per worker rather than equal to the per capita stock of capital installed in whole economy.   5 
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u ,  (7) 
where  ( ) t t c Bk w a - = 1 ,  is the equilibrium competitive wage. 
 
2.3. Unions: The right-to-manage hypothesis
7 
 
The right-to-manage union programme is characterised as usual (see, for instance, Pencavel, 1984; 
Mezzetti and Dinopoulos, 1991; Booth 1995; Corneo and Marquardt, 2000; Layard et al., 2005) by 
the following constrained utility maximisation of the union’s members, where the preferences of the 
union are expressed over pairs of wages and levels of employment at time t, that is:
8 
  { } ( ) ( )
g g - - × - =
1
, , , 1 max
, t t c t u t u w u w w V
t u ,  (PP) 
subject to the aggregate labour demand (7).
9 The parameter  1 0 < <g  measures the excess wage 
elasticity in the union’s objective function, i.e. it captures the union intensity in fixing the wage 
relative to employment, thus trading-off between high wages and low unemployment, i.e. the higher 
(lower) g , the more the union is wage-oriented (employment-oriented).
10 
    Maximisation of (PP) yields: 









,  (8) 
implying that the wage fixed by the union is a mark up over the equilibrium competitive wage. 
Notice  that  Eq.  (8)  implies  that  a  finite  positive  solution  to  programme  (PP)  requires 
( ) g a g = + < : 1 / 1 . 
    Exploiting Eq. (8), the constant unemployment rate reads as: 




- = u .  (9) 
From Eqs. (9) and (5) it is easy to see that the interest rate is a constant and, in particular, it is 





The government runs an unemployment benefit policy at a balanced budget. We assume that only a 
proportional (non-distorting) tax on the consumption of the young at the rate  0 > t t  is levied and 
adjusted in every period to finance the unemployment benefit expenditure.
11 Therefore, the per 
capita time-t government constraint reads as: 
                                                 
7 These right-to-manage rules imply that the union cares about wages and employment, while choosing unilaterally the 
wage rate, and under such a choice, firms unilaterally choose employment. 
8 Notice that, given the OLG structure of the economy, programme (PP) implies that in each period only young-aged 
people are unionised. Moreover, the union cannot commit future generations to a certain wage policy. 
9 The reference wage of the union is the competitive wage. 
10 Following the terminology used by Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991), the union is assumed to be “wage oriented” 
(“employment oriented”) if  5 . 0 > g  ( 5 . 0 < g ). 
11 We have deliberately chosen a tax levied exclusively on the consumption of the young for two reasons: (i) a better 
analytical tractability, and (ii) in this way the nature of the unemployment benefit policy is purely redistributive, that is, 
consumption taxed away from the young rebated to the same individuals as a benefit for the unemployed time. This   6 
  t t t t c u b , 1 t = ,  (10) 
where the left-hand side represents the unemployment benefit expenditure and the right-hand side 
the  tax  receipts.  Collecting  Eqs.  (1),  (8)  and  (9)  and  knowing  that  t c t w z b , := ,  the  (constant) 
equilibrium consumption tax which balances the government budget is:
12 
 
( ) ( ) [ ]

























.  (11) 
 
2.5. Balanced growth 
 
We now close the model with the analysis of the balanced equilibrium growth. Given Eq. (10) and 
knowing that  t t N N = +1 , the market-clearing condition in goods as well as in capital markets is 
expressed by the equality  t t s k = +1 , i.e. the per capita stock of capital installed at time  1 + t  equals 
the amount of resources saved at time t. Using Eq. (3) to substitute out for  t s  into the equilibrium 
condition we get: 






.  (12) 
    We are now wondering about the effects of a rise in the relative wage intensity of the union (and 
thus in the rate of unemployment) on the rate of economic growth. To this purpose, let us rewrite 
Eq. (12) as a generic function of the union wage preference parameter g  as: 
  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] { } g m g m u w k k t u t t , , 1 1 + + = .  (13) 
The total derivative of Eq. (13) with respect to g  gives:
13 
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1 1 .  (14) 
Eq. (14) reveals that a rise in the union’s relative wage intensity has an ambiguous effect on capital 
accumulation and, hence, on the rate of per capita income growth. In particular, a rise in  g  (i) 
increases the wage earned by the young when employed, thus promoting both savings and capital 
accumulation,  and  (ii)  given  the  neoclassical  labour  market  context  of  supply  and  demand,  it 
reduces the employment rate and, hence, the saving rate. The final effect, therefore, depends on 
which  of  the  two opposite  forces  (i.e.  higher  wages  and  lower  employment)  dominates.  If  the 
relative weight of capital in production and the replacement rate are both high enough, the positive 
wage-effect overcompensates the negative unemployment-effect, and hence the rate of per capita 
income growth in an economy with unionised labour and unemployment is definitively higher than 
the growth rate we had before unionisation in spite of a lower employment rate. 
                                                                                                                                                            
implies that the positive effect of unionisation on both economic growth and welfare – as shown in this paper – does not 
rely on any inter-generational transfer mechanisms which redistribute resources across generation, i.e. from the old-
dissavers to the young-savers (as it would have been the case if, for instance, the unemployment benefit system was 
financed entirely or partially by either capital income taxes or lump-sum taxes on the elderly). The justification for taxes 
levied only upon the young people’s consumption may be more convincing, however, if the elderly are assumed live on 
tax-exempt pension funds. We acknowledge that analysis of social security in an economy with non-competitive labour 
is a promising direction of research. 
12 It can readily be shown that the denominator of Eq. (11) is positive for any  g g < . 
13 Details are given in Appendix A.   7 
    To analyse ultimately which of the two forces dominates and to characterise how the union’s 
relative wage intensity affects economic growth in this simple stylised economy, we combine Eqs. 
(8), (9) and (12) to obtain: 
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z z . 
    From Eq. (15) the growth rate of the per capita stock of capital in the unionised-wage economy 
with unemployment (which obviously coincides with the rate of per capita income growth since the 
unemployment rate is constant, see Eq. 9)
14 may be expressed as: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 - H × + = g g c u g g ,  (16) 




= B gc a
b
b
 being the growth rate in the competitive equilibrium economy with full 
employment. Notice that  ( ) g u g  is independent of time so that the model does not show transitional 
dynamics, and thus a marginal change in the wage fixed by the union – as expressed by a marginal 
change  in  the  union’s  relative  wage  intensity  g   –,  automatically  implies  an  instantaneous 
adjustment of the economy to a new balanced growth path. It is worth noting that in this model both 
the unemployment rate and the interest rate (and hence the growth rate of the economy) are constant 
over time, that  is, the  model does  not exhibit the  convergence property. Therefore, a  marginal 
change in the exogenous parameters of the model will imply an instantaneous jump of the economy 
from an old to a new balanced growth path. In this sense our model does not show transitional 
dynamics just like any  Ak -typed models. In this paper we used the terminology widely adopted in 
the economic literature (e.g., amongst many others, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Note, however, 
that a simple jump from a balanced growth path to another due to a permanent change in some 
exogenous parameters of the model may be thought to be a special type of transitional dynamics. In 
particular, a constant rate of per capita income growth does not guarantee any short-run effect (i.e., 
out of the balanced growth path) of changing the key parameters of the model.
15 
    From Eq. (16) it can readily be seen that if  0 = g  (i.e., no union’s power in fixing wages), then 
the  growth  rate  in  the  unionised-wage  economy  and  the  growth  rate  in  the  competitive-wage 
economy coincide irrespective of the value of the replacement rate, that is  ( ) 1 0 = H  and  ( ) c u g g = 0  
for any  1 0 < < z . 
    Below we show that depending on the mutual relationship between the replacement rate, the 
capital’s weight in production and the union relative wage intensity, a unionised-wage economy 
with unemployment may grow faster than a competitive-wage economy with full employment. 
    Analysis of Eq. (16) gives the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a positive union’s relative 
wage  intensity  such  that  a  unionised-wage  economy  with  unemployment  grows  faster  than  a 
competitive-wage economy with full employment is  z z > . 
 
                                                 
14 In fact, the growth rate of per capita income in the unionised-wage economy can easily be expressed as: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
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.   
15 Assume, for instance, that the union’s relative wage intensity increases. As a consequence, the unemployment rate 
raises and the interest rate shrinks. Hence, a lower interest rate reduces the material consumption of the current old age 
people. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to clarify this point.   8 
Proof. The proof straightforwardly derives  from differentiating Eq. (16) with respect to  g  and 
evaluating it at  0 = g , that is: 












































.   
where  a - =1 : z . Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 1 reveals that if the replacement rate is high enough, the unionisation of labour markets 
promotes economic growth. In this case, the positive wage-effect (i.e. the higher wages earned by 
the  young  when  employed)  which  increases  the  saving  rate  overcompensates  the  negative 
unemployment-effect which instead acts negatively on savings. Definitively, under the condition 
stated in Proposition 1, a higher  g  implies a higher saving rate and, hence, a higher rate of per 
capita income growth. 
    Proposition  1  showed  that  a  relatively  high  wage-oriented  union  can  let  a  unionised-wage 
economy with unemployment grow faster than a competitive-wage economy with full employment. 
In the following proposition we show the existence of (i) a whole range of the union’s objectives 
which respect to which a Cobb-Douglas economy with unionised labour and unemployment grows 
faster than a  Cobb-Douglas competitive equilibrium economy  with  full  employment, and (ii) a 
growth-maximising value of the union’s relative wage intensity. 
 
Proposition 2. (1) Let  z z £  hold. Then  ( ) c u g g < g  for any  g g < < 0 . (2) Let  z z >  hold. Then 
( ) g u g   is  an  inverted  U-shaped  function  of  the  union’s  relative  wage  intensity  and  ( ) g u g   is 
maximised at  g g ˆ =  with  ( ) c u g g > g  for any  ° < < g g 0  and  ( ) c u g g < g  for any  g g g < < °  where 
g g g < ° < ˆ . 
 
Proof. The proof uses the following derivative: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
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 for any  1 0 < <g . 
    If  z z >  then 
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,  (18) 
is the growth-maximising relative wage intensity of the union. Notice that  g g < ˆ  holds for any 
z z > . Since  ( ) c u g g = 0 ,  ( ) g u g  is a positive (negative) monotonic function of g  for any  g g ˆ 0 < <  
( g g g < < ˆ )  and  ( ) [ ] ( ) c c u g z g g + < + = + ® 1 1 1 lim g g g ,  then  there  always  exists  a  threshold  value   9 
( ) g g g , ˆ Î °  such that  ( ) c u g g = ° g , and thus  ( ) c u g g > g  for any  ° < < g g 0  and  ( ) c u g g < g  for any 
g g g < < ° . Q.E.D. 
 
From Propositions 1 and 2 the following remark holds: 
 
Remark 1. Although unionisation can always be desirable as an inducement to per capita income 
growth  (provided  the  condition  stated  in  Proposition  1),  the  existence  of  a  growth-maximising 
relative  wage  intensity  of  the  union,  gˆ,  implies  that  a  unionised-wage  economy  may  jump 
instantaneously over the highest possible balanced growth path. Moreover, there exists a whole 
range of the relative weight attached by the union to wages such that an economy with unionised 
labour  and  unemployment  grows  faster  than  an  economy  with  competitive  labour  and  full 
employment. 
 
    Moreover, it is easy to show also that: (i) when the government chooses a high replacement rate, 
the union  should  be relatively  wage-oriented rather than  employment-oriented to pursue higher 
growth rates in spite of a higher unemployment rate. Conversely, this means that when the union is 
relatively wage-oriented, the rate of economic growth is increased when the replacement rate is 
high  enough.  This  follows  from  ( )













;  and  (ii)  when  the  technology  of 
production  is  relatively  capital-oriented  rather  than  labour-oriented  (i.e.,  the  parameter  a   is 
sufficiently  high),  a  relatively  wage-oriented  rather  than  employment-oriented  union  speeds  up 
economic growth, that is  ( )















    The policy implications of our findings are straightforward. In particular, depending on the size 
of the union’s relative wage intensity, the government should follow the union growth-maximising 
rule and then choose appropriately the replacement rate, as long as the existence of a finite positive 
consumption tax which balances the unemployment benefit expenditure is guaranteed for any  z z >  




Analysis of both growth and welfare effects of public policies in endogenous growth models is long 
lasting. For instance, Barro (1990) showed – in a model with public services used as an input in 
production – that the growth-maximising tax rate used to finance the government expenditure at a 
balanced  budget  coincides  with  the  welfare  maximising  one,  whereas  Futagami  et  al.  (1993) 
showed that if public services are assumed to be a stock variable, then the growth-maximising and 
the welfare-maximising policies are different. In this  section, we will  analyse  how the  lifetime 
welfare of the representative generation will react following a rise in the power of the union to set 
the wage rate. In particular, we will try to give an answer to the following questions. 
 
(i)  How unionisation affects the individual lifetime welfare when the economy switches 
from a competitive equilibrium growth path with full employment to a new equilibrium 
growth path with unemployment? 
 
(ii)  Does the unionisation of labour markets create a trade-off between growth-maximising 
and welfare-maximising policies? 
   10 
Comparison  of  the  growth-maximising  objective  of  the  union  with  the  welfare-maximising 
objective of the government in this simple stylised OLG economy implies that both policies exactly 
coincide along the balanced growth path. 
    Assuming as a measurement of the individual welfare the utility attained by the representative 
generation  over  the  life  cycle,  below  we  investigate  how  the  degree  of  unionisation  of  labour 
markets (as measured by the relative weight that the union attaches to wages) affects the lifetime 
indirect  utility  index  of  the  representative  generation  in  a  unionised-wage  economy  with 
unemployment ( u W ) in comparison with that attained in a competitive-wage economy with full 
employment ( c W ). 
    In particular, we assume a benevolent government whose purpose is to maximise the lifetime 
indirect utility index of the representative generation with respect to the power of the union to set 
the wage (g ). Since the economy is always in a position of balanced growth and both young-aged 
and old-aged consumptions grow without transition at the (constant) rate  ( ) ( ) ( ) g g g u c u c u g g g = =
2 1 , , , 
the  lifetime  welfare  grows  steadily  at  the  same  rate  along  the  balanced  growth  path,  i.e. 
( ) ( ) g g u V u g g = , . Therefore, the following proposition holds: 
 
Proposition 3. (1) Let  z z £  hold. Then  ( ) t c t u W W , , < g  for any  g g < < 0 . (2) Let  z z >  hold. Then 
( ) g t u W ,   is  an  inverted  U-shaped function  of  the  union’s  relative  wage  intensity  and  ( ) g t u W ,   is 
maximised at  g g ˆ =  with  ( ) t c t u W W , , > g  for any  ° < < g g 0  and  ( ) t c t u W W , , < g  for any  g g g < < °  
where  g g g < ° < ˆ . 
 
Proof. See Appendix B. 
 
Proposition 3 reveals that the growth-maximising relative wage intensity of the union coincides 
with the government welfare-maximising policy, and the higher the replacement rate is the more 
likely  a  positive  relationship  between  economic  growth  and  unemployment  (i.e.  welfare  and 
unemployment) exists. Therefore, under the  hypotheses and the conditions  stated in point 2 of 
Propositions 3, there exists a whole range of the union’s preference in fixing the wage rate relative 
to employment with respect to which individuals are better off in an economy with unionised labour 
and unemployment rather than in a competitive equilibrium economy with full employment along 




Using the basic one-sector model of endogenous growth with overlapping generations and Cobb-
Douglas utility and production functions, we showed that the unionisation of labour markets may be 
growth-  and  welfare-enhancing  if  both  the  replacement  rate  (as  part  of  the  public  provided 
unemployment  benefit  system)  and  the  weight  of  capital  in  production  are  high  enough.  In 
particular,  we  assumed  the  standard  right-to-manage  model  and  showed  the  existence  of  (i)  a 
growth-maximising relative wage intensity of the union with respect to which the economy jumps 
instantaneously over the highest possible balanced growth path in equilibrium, and (ii) a whole 
range  of  the  union’s  relative  wage  intensity  such  that  an  economy  with  unionised  labour  and 
unemployment grows faster than an economy with competitive labour and full employment. 
    Moreover,  we  argued  that  the  more  the  union  is  wage-oriented  rather  than  an  employment-
oriented the higher is the rate of per capita income growth in spite of a higher unemployment rate. 
    These results are rather unusual within the existing endogenous growth literature framed in the 
basic OLG context where a Romer-type externality (assumed here to be the average per capita 
stock of capital installed in the whole economy, rather than the stock of capital in per worker terms)   11 
represents the engine of endogenous growth, and indicate that a positive unemployment rate may be 
beneficial  for  both  economic  growth  and  welfare  provided  that  (i) the  technology  is  relatively 
capital-oriented and (ii) the unemployment benefit system is sufficiently generous.
16 Therefore, a 
policymaker may favour the occurrence of the latter condition turning on unionisation from a threat 




In this appendix we present details of Eq. (14) in the main text. 
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Proof of Proposition 3. 
 
Since the consumption tax is constant in equilibrium (see Eq. 11 in the main text), and  1 c  is a 
monotonic increasing function of the per capita stock of capital, then the growth rate of  1 c  is given 
by: 
  ( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )( )














































1 .  (B1) 
    Moreover, since the unemployment rate and the interest rate are both constant, the growth rate of 
the retirement period consumption ( 2 c ) may easily be expressed as: 
  ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )















































2 .  (B2) 
Knowing that  1 c  and  2 c  grow without transition at the constant rate  ( ) g u g , then the lifetime welfare 
of the representative generation (see Eq. P in the main text) grows steadily at the same constant rate 
along the balanced growth path. 
                                                 
16 It is worth noting that although the (non-distorting) young-aged consumption tax used to finance the benefit system 
acts (just like a wage tax) as a redistributive device within the same working age generation, the endogenous growth 
literature has argued that such a tax, different from a wage tax which is growth-reducing, may be growth-neutral as 
shown by Rebelo (1991).   12 
    Now,  consider  the  following  homogeneous  of  degree  one  utility  function,  which  represents 
homothetic preferences over the life cycle consumption bundles of the generation born in period t, 
that is: 
  ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 , 2 , 1 1 , 2 , 1 ln ln , ln 1 : + + + = + = t t t t t t c c c c W U b b ,   
where 
  ( ) b
b
b + + + + × = 1 1 , 2 1
1








:   with  ( ) +¥ Î , 0 s   being  the  subjective  discount  rate.  From  Eq.  (B3)  individual 
welfare in the unionised-wage economy grows at the rate 
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Exploiting Eq. (B3) the dynamic evolution of individual welfare as a function of the union’s relative 
wage intensity can be described, after some algebraic manipulations, as 
  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) g g g t u u t u W g W , 1 , 1 × + = + .  (B4) 
The government objective is to maximise the solution of Eq. (B4) with respect to g , that is: 
  { } ( ) ( ) [ ]
t
u t u g W W g g g + × = 1 max 0 , ,  (B5) 
where  0 0 > W  is the initial value of individual utility and  ( ) g u g  is determined by Eq. (16) in the 
main text. Differentiating Eq. (B5) with respect to g  yields 
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 is given by Eq. (17) in the main text. Therefore, 






g t u W
 for any  1 0 < <g . This proves point (1); 
 
    if  z z >  then 












¶ t u W
,   
where gˆ is the welfare-maximising relative wage intensity in the government’s objective function 
(which coincides with growth-maximising relative wage intensity in the union’s objective function 
– see Eq. 18 in the  main text). Since  ( ) t c t u W W , , 0 = ,  ( ) g t u W ,   is a positive (negative)  monotonic 




c t u g W z g W W + < + = ® 1 1 lim 0 0 , g g g , then 
there always exists a threshold value  ( ) g g g , ˆ Î °  such that  ( ) t c t u W W , , = ° g , and thus  ( ) t c t u W W , , > g  for 
any  ° < < g g 0  and  ( ) t c t u W W , , < g  for any  g g g < < ° . This proves point (2). Q.E.D. 
   13 
Propositions 2 and 3 reveal that both per capita income and individual welfare grow steadily at the 
same  constant  rate  along  the  balanced  growth  path.  Therefore,  under  the  hypotheses  and  the 
conditions stated in points 2 of Propositions 2 and 3, both the rate of per capita income growth and 
the indirect utility index of the representative individual are higher in a unionised-wage economy 
with  unemployment  than  in  a  competitive-wage  with  full  employment.  Moreover,  the  growth-
maximising and the welfare-maximising objectives are exactly the same along the balanced growth 
path. Therefore, for any  z z >  and  ° < < g g 0  individuals living in a unionised-wage economy with 
unemployment  are  better  off  than  those  living  in  a  competitive-wage  economy  with  full 
employment. In particular  g g ˆ =  implies an instantaneous adjustment of both the rate of per capita 
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